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AbstrAct
Introduction The effectiveness of excise tax increases 
as a tool for reducing tobacco consumption depends 
largely on how the tax increases impact the retail 
price. We estimate this relationship in South Africa for 
2001–2015.
Data Statistics South Africa provided disaggregated 
cigarette price data, used in the calculation of the 
Consumers’ Price Index. Data on the excise tax per 
cigarette were obtained from Budget Reviews prepared 
by the National Treasury of South Africa.
Methods Regression equations were estimated for 
each month. The month-on-month change in cigarette 
prices in February through April was regressed against 
March’s excise tax change to estimate the pass-through 
coefficient. For the other 9 months, the month-on-
month change in cigarette price was regressed against 
monthly dummy variables to determine the size of the 
non-tax-related price increase in each of these months. 
The analysis was performed in both nominal and real 
(inflation-adjusted) terms.
Findings Expressed in real terms, the excise tax was 
undershifted. A R1.00 (one rand) increase in the excise 
tax is associated with an increase in the retail price of 
cigarettes of R0.90 in the pre-2010 period, and R0.49 
in the post-2010 period. In the pre-2010 period, the 
tobacco industry increased the retail price of cigarettes 
in July/August, independent of the excise tax increase. 
The discretionary July/August price increases largely 
disappeared after 2010, primarily because the market 
became more competitive.
conclusion The degree of excise tax pass-through, and 
the magnitude of discretionary increases in cigarette 
prices, is significantly determined by the competitive 
environment in the cigarette market.
IntroDuctIon
The effectiveness of excise tax increases as a tool 
for reducing tobacco use depends on how the tax 
increase impacts the retail price of the product.1 
People change their purchasing behavior in response 
to retail price changes, not in response to excise 
tax changes. Typically, smokers have no incentive 
to know the tax amount on cigarettes (and prob-
ably do not know the quantum of the tax), but they 
are made aware of the retail price at each purchase 
occasion. There is consensus in the literature that, 
despite the addictiveness of nicotine, an increase in 
tobacco prices does reduce tobacco consumption.1 
An excise tax increase typically increases the price 
of cigarettes. The magnitude of the price increase 
depends on the degree to which the tax increase is 
passed through to consumers. The degree of pass-
through thus determines the effectiveness of the 
excise tax in reducing tobacco consumption (apart 
from the hypothetical cases in which demand or 
supply is perfectly price-inelastic). For example, 
a fully passed-through tax increase is more effec-
tive in reducing tobacco consumption than a tax 
increase partially borne by the producer. This paper 
considers the dynamics of cigarette excise tax pass-
through in South Africa.
For many years, South Africa was regarded as a 
pioneer in tobacco control among low-income and 
middle-income countries, particularly for its use 
of excise taxes.2 Value-added tax (VAT) has been 
levied at 14% of the (ex-VAT) retail price since 
1993. In 1994, excise taxes and VAT, combined, 
comprised 33% of the retail price of cigarettes. In 
that year, the government announced that it would 
target a total tax burden on cigarettes of 50%, to be 
achieved within an unspecified number of years.3 
In 1997, the government announced it had reached 
the target.3 The excise tax in South Africa is levied 
as a uniform specific tax. Between 1998 and 2005 
the government annually adjusted the excise tax to 
maintain the 50% total tax threshold. In 2006 the 
total tax target was increased to 52% of the recom-
mended retail price of the most popular brand. 
Since 2006 the tax regime and the targeted tax 
percentage has remained unchanged.
British American Tobacco (BAT) is the dominant 
cigarette producer and distributor in South Africa. 
Before 2010 BAT’s main competitors were other 
multinationals (Philip Morris International, Japan 
Tobacco International and Imperial Tobacco), but 
BAT was the unchallenged price leader. According 
to Euromonitor, BAT had a 91% market share in 
20054 and although its market share has decreased 
somewhat subsequently, it is still above 80%.5 BAT 
had much pricing power to substantially increase 
the net-of-tax price of cigarettes. Whereas the real 
(inflation-adjusted) net-of-tax price of cigarettes 
remained broadly constant (and even decreased 
slightly) between the early 1960s and early 1990s, 
it doubled between 1994 and 2010. This, together 
with a fivefold increase in the real excise tax, 
resulted in a near-tripling of real cigarette retail 
prices between 1994 and 2010. The rapid increase 
in cigarette prices, together with sluggish economic 
growth, meant that cigarettes became substantially 
less affordable.6 Because of these price increases 
and other factors, including tobacco control inter-
ventions, smoking prevalence decreased from 
approximately a third to less than a fifth between 
1994 and 2012.2 7
In 2010 the South African cigarette market 
changed substantially. The high profits earned 
by BAT and other multinationals attracted many 
small cigarette manufacturers and distributors, 
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who undermined the established firms. The new entrants were 
primarily competing in the low-price segment, selling at prices 
substantially lower than the economy brands sold by the incum-
bents. There was also a substantial increase in the illicit market 
that year.8
This paper estimates the pass-through of cigarette excise 
taxes before and after 2010 in South Africa. South Africa is an 
important example for other countries, since it was one of the 
first middle-income countries to use excise tax increases as a 
tobacco control tool. The paper adds to the literature on excise 
tax pass-through,9–15 but, crucially, considers a structural break 
in the industry’s pricing reaction to excise tax increases.
DAtA
This paper uses monthly cigarette price data collected by Statis-
tics South Africa from December 2001 to December 2005 and 
from January 2008 to December 2015. Statistics South Africa 
provided us the data on request. The gap in the data is due to 
a change in the data capturing system at Statistics South Africa, 
when the price data were ‘lost’. The price data are used to compile 
the Consumers’ Price Index, and is typically collected in the first 
2 weeks of each month. The Consumers’ Price Index (CPI) is 
published around the 20th of the following month. All prices 
refer to packs of 20 cigarettes. Each of the 97 948 observations 
(over 145 months) contains (1) the brand, (2) the price and (3) 
the geographical region of the outlet (the name of a city, town, 
municipality or a defined rural/urban area within a town). In 
the sample there are 51 different brands and 77 regions, corre-
sponding to the sampling frame used by Statistics South Africa.
For each month, an average price was calculated across outlets 
for each brand-region combination, subject to there being at least 
three observations for that brand in that month (irrespective 
of region). A total of 1 626 observations (1.7%) was excluded 
from the analysis because they did not meet this requirement. 
Where a price observation deviated by more than three stan-
dard deviations or by more than 50% from the mean price for 
the associated brand-month combination, the observation was 
dropped on the grounds that it was either not representative 
of that brand-month combination, or an error. As a result 889 
observations (0.9%) were excluded. Month-on-month differ-
ences of these brand-region average prices were calculated for 
each month, which gave us a total of 32 836 observations for 
use in the regressions. The observations used in the regressions 
were based on an average of 2.9 raw observations (ie, (97 948–1 
626–889)/32 836).
Statistics South Africa informed the authors that the same 
retail outlets are surveyed from month to month. Where this 
was not possible (eg, an outlet closed down), they would sample 
a similar retail outlet from that region in order to keep the 
sampling frame as consistent as possible over time.
We used multiple annual Budget Reviews, prepared by the 
National Treasury of South Africa, to obtain the excise tax per 
pack of cigarettes, which is levied as a uniform specific tax. The 
excise tax is adjusted in late February each year. The largest 
nominal excise tax increase in the sample was R1.24 in 2010 
(from R7.70 to R8.94), while the smallest was R0.34 in 2002 
(from R3.17 to R3.51). To synchronie the tax changes with the 
price changes, the tax increase is reflected in March, because by 
the time the excise tax increase is announced, the price survey in 
February is already completed.
We performed the analysis in both nominal and real terms. 
Results are presented for both nominal and real prices since there 
is no a priori reason for a similar magnitude of pass through 
when month-to-month variations in general (all-CPI) inflation 
rates are corrected for. For the analysis in real terms, the effect 
of inflation is removed by dividing all price and tax data by the 
appropriate Consumers’ Price Index (base December 2012). The 
South Africa currency is rand (R). The value of the currency fluc-
tuated over the period of analysis, but averaged about US$0.10 
per R.
MethoDology
The study aims to estimate the extent to which the cigarette retail 
prices change in response to an excise tax change. To maintain 
their per-pack profit, and holding costs constant, a R1 increase 
in the excise tax would force firms to increase the retail price 
by R1.14 (because 14% VAT is levied on the excise tax as well). 
The tax increase does not obligate firms to raise prices by R1.14 
immediately, or even at all. The tax increase could be passed 
through over several months. The degree to which the firm is 
able to pass through the tax increase is influenced by the degree 
of market competition and individual firms’ discretion.
In its simplest form, one would regress the change in 
the average retail price of brand i in region j in March (ie, 
∆PijMarch = PijMarch − PijFebruary) on the change in the excise
tax in March (ie, ΔTMarch). The coefficient on ΔTMarch indicates 
by how much the retail price of cigarettes increases in response 
to a one unit increase in the excise tax. The magnitude of this 
pass-through coefficient β allows one to determine whether the 
tax is contemporaneously overshifted (β>1.14), undershifted 
(β<1.14) or fully passed through (β=1.14). The split occurs 
at β=1.14, rather than at β=1, because the excise tax is subject 
to VAT (14%).
Tobacco companies could pre-emptively raise the price of ciga-
rettes (ie, before the tax increase is announced), or delay the 
price increase for competitive or other reasons. We assume that, 
other than the contemporaneous effect, the tax increase influ-
ences the price 1 month on either side of March. The decision to 
use this time horizon was driven by (1) a preliminary empirical 
analysis of the data at hand and (2) a literature (not limited to 
only tobacco) that indicates that the full impact of a tax increase 
on the price typically happens within 3 months.16–18
For each of the monthly price changes in February, March 
and April, we estimate the following regression equation: 
∆Pijyt = βpt ·∆TyMarch + εyt (1)
where t denotes the month (February, March and April for 
the pre-emptive, contemporaneous and delayed price changes, 
respectively), y the year, p the period (pre-2010 or post-2010) 
and εyt the idiosyncratic error term.
For the other 9 months of the year, we assume that any 
price changes are discretionary, determined by the stra-
tegic prerogatives of the tobacco industry. For each of these 
months, we estimate the following regression equation: 





where t denotes the month (May through January), is a dummy 
variable=1 if the month is t and =0 otherwise, y denotes the 
year, p denotes the period (pre-2010 or post-2010) and εyt is an 
idiosyncratic error term.
The β coefficients in equation (1) are pass-through coef-
ficients, while the δ coefficients in equation (2) show the 
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month-on-month price increase, on average, in the month to 
which it refers.
All regressions are estimated by weighted least squares (WLS), 
with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, using Stata version 
12. We use WLS, rather than ordinary least squares, to give appro-
priately more weight in our regressions to a brand-region average
price that is comprised of a larger number of individual price obser-
vations than other brand-region average prices. We present the
results first in nominal terms and then in real terms.
The model is parsimonious, in that the pass-through coeffi-
cients are based solely on the tax changes and the model does 
not control for an underlying trend in the price, or for changes 
in the costs of production. Not controlling for changes in the 
cost of production could bias the pass-through coefficients. In 
particular, if the price increase in February, March and April is 
the result of both excise tax and production cost increases, the 
pass-through coefficient will be biased upwards, because the 
impact of the cost increase on the price increase will be wrongly 
attributed to the tax change. Given South Africa’s moderately 
inflationary environment (averaging 5.8% between December 
2001 and December 2015), it seems likely that nominal per-ciga-
rette cost of production has increased. As such, the pass-through 
coefficients obtained in this specification are probably biased 
upwards and should therefore be considered upper limits.
In the specification in real terms, the pass-through coefficients 
will be biased upwards only if the real costs of production were 
increasing (ie, the nominal costs of producing cigarettes were 
increasing more rapidly than the inflation rate). If the real costs 
of production were decreasing, the pass-through coefficients 
would be biased downwards. The fact that we cannot control 
for changes in the cost of production, is a drawback of this study. 
The tobacco industry is not obliged to publish such costs, which 
are regarded as confidential. The tobacco industry certainly has 
no incentive to provide them to the authors. Some published 
studies, especially those that use industry data, control for 
costs,14–16 19–21 but others do not.22–26
The study assumes that wholesale and retail margins have 
remained constant over time. While we do not have data to test 
this assumption, it seems unlikely that the margins have increased 
over time because they are currently very low (typically around 
10%). Competition between retailers is fierce, putting pres-
sure on retail margins. Competition between the large cigarette 
manufacturers is limited, allowing them to push up prices. We 
are confident that retail price increases are influenced more by 
changes in the ex-factory price charged by cigarette manufac-
turers, than by wholesalers’ or retailers’ margins.
results
graphical analysis
Figure 1 presents the monthly weighted average nominal price of 
a pack of cigarettes for the period December 2001 to December 
2015, barring a 2-year gap in 2006 and 2007, and the nominal 
excise tax amount per pack over the same period. The increase 
in the nominal price of cigarettes is near-monotone, but there 
are definite steps around March and, less-pronounced, around 
July and August. The March price increase corresponds to the 
excise tax increase, but the price increase in July/August seems 
to be discretionary.
Effective excise tax policy considers changes in the real excise 
tax, rather than changes in the nominal excise tax.27 In figure 2 
we present the average price and excise tax on cigarettes in 
real terms. The nominal excise tax increases monotonically. In 
contrast, the real excise tax has a jagged shape; it increases each 
March but slowly erodes over the course of the year under the 
influence of inflation.
Figure 2 appears to indicate a structural break in cigarette 
prices and taxes in April 2010. Between December 2001 and 
April 2010 the real price and the real excise tax on cigarettes 
Figure 1 Nominal average retail price and excise tax on cigarettes, South Africa, 2001–2015.
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increased by 64% and 71%, respectively. In contrast, between 
April 2010 and December 2015, the real price and real excise 
tax remained broadly constant. We performed Chow tests to 
test formally for a structural break in cigarette pricing in April 
2010. If there was no structural break, each population pass-
through coefficient and monthly effect would be the same after 
April 2010 as it was before April 2010. We find strong evidence 
that this is not the case. In particular, the contemporaneous pass-
through estimates differ significantly before and after April 2010 
(p<0.001 for the Chow tests on nominal and real data). Further-
more, the 9-monthly effects (May through December) differ 
significantly before and after April 2010 (p<0.05 for all months 
in both nominal and real terms). These results give strong statis-
tical support to our claim that there was a structural break in 
cigarette pricing in April 2010. Within this context, the empir-
ical work considers two periods: December 2001 to March 2010 
and April 2010 to December 2015.
estimating the pass-through coefficients
Analysis in nominal terms
Table 1 presents the regression results of equation (1) for 
February, March and April, and equation (2) for the other 
9 months, where the price and excise tax are expressed in 
nominal terms, for both pre-2010 and post-2010.
The contemporaneous pass-through coefficient is 1.21 (95% CI 
1.18 to 1.25) for pre-2010 and 1.11 (95% CI 1.06 to 1.15) for 
post-2010. Thus, a R1 increase in the excise tax, announced in 
the latter part of February, was associated, on average, with a 
R1.21 price increase in March before 2010 and a R1.11 price 
increase after 2010.
The nominal tax increase is contemporaneously overshifted 
pre-2010, since the 95% CI lies above 1.14 (the pass-through 
coefficient that indicates full pass-through). In the post-2010 
period we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the nominal tax 
Figure 2 Real average retail price and excise tax on cigarettes, South Africa, 2001–2015.
table 1 Pass-through coefficients (February to April) and monthly effects, nominal prices
Pre-2010 Post-2010
Data from month β (Feb-Apr) or δ 95% cI n r2 β 95% cI n r2
Feb 0.04*** 0.03 to 0.06 1676 0.02 0.02 −0.01 to 0.05 1213 0.00
Mar 1.21*** 1.18 to 1.25 1700 0.84 1.11*** 1.06 to 1.15 1187 0.69
Apr 0.13*** 0.10 to 0.15 1176 0.09 0.12*** 0.09 to 0.14 1678 0.06
May 0.04*** 0.02 to 0.06 1199 0.03 0.01*** −0.00 to 0.03 1606 0.00
Jun 0.05*** 0.03 to 0.06 1211 0.04 0.00 −0.02 to 0.02 1602 0.00
Jul 0.33*** 0.28 to 0.37 1216 0.29 0.11*** 0.09 to 0.14 1667 0.05
Aug 0.94*** 0.88 to 1.00 1210 0.54 0.15*** 0.13 to 0.18 1493 0.14
Sep 0.11*** 0.09 to 0.14 1202 0.09 0.17*** 0.14 to 0.20 1436 0.11
Oct 0.05*** 0.03 to 0.06 1205 0.03 0.01 −0.01 to 0.02 1447 0.00
Nov 0.04*** 0.02 to 0.05 1190 0.02 0.02* −0.00 to 0.04 1447 0.00
Dec 0.02 −0.01 to 0.05 1189 0.00 0.02** 0.00 to 0.03 1455 0.00
Jan 0.03*** 0.01 to 0.05 1151 0.01 −0.00 −0.02 to 0.01 1280 0.00
The β coefficients for February to April are derived from equation 1 (in text), and are pass-through coefficients. The δ coefficients for May to January are derived from equation 2 
and indicate the month-on-month average increase in cigarette prices, expressed in rand per pack. N = the number of brand-region combinations.
Significance: ***=1%; **=5%; *=10%
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increase is contemporaneously fully passed through, since 1.14 
is included in the 95% CI.
There is practically no evidence that the tobacco industry 
pre-emptively raises the price of cigarettes in the month before 
the tax increase, given the small, albeit significant, pass-through 
coefficient (0.04) for February pre-2010, and the insignificant 
pass-through coefficient post-2010. There is some evidence for 
a 1-month delayed pass-through effect, with pass-through coef-
ficients of 0.13 pre-2010 and 0.12 post-2010.
The pass-through in the ‘three-month window’ is the sum of 
the pass-through coefficients in February, March and April. This 
gives an indication of the ‘long-term’ impact of the excise tax 
change on the price, although we acknowledge that this ‘three-
month window’ is rather arbitrary. For pre-2010, the 3-month 
pass-through is 1.38 (95% CI 1.34 to 1.42) and for post-2010 
it is 1.25 (95% CI 1.19 to 1.31). Thus, the tax increase is over-
shifted in both periods. However, recalling that the pass-through 
coefficients based on nominal prices and excise taxes are likely to 
be biased upwards, this result is treated with caution.
The coefficients for May through January are not pass-through 
coefficients, but indicate the month-on-month average increase 
in the nominal price of cigarettes, expressed in rand per pack. 
For example, the coefficient for May in the pre-2010 period 
(0.04) indicates that the nominal price of cigarettes increased by 
an average of R0.04 per pack in May in that period.
With the exception of July, August and September, the monthly 
nominal price increases were extremely small, in both pre-2010 
and post-2010 periods, implying that nominal cigarette prices 
were largely kept unchanged in those months.
Pre-2010, nominal cigarette prices increased sharply in July 
(average of R0.33) and August (average of R0.94), which, inde-
pendent of the tax-induced price increase in March, represents 
an 8.1% increase in the average real price (for the 2 months 
combined) in the 2001–2010 period. Post-2010, the July and 
August price increases were miniscule in comparison (R0.11 and 
R0.15).
Analysis in real terms
Table 2 presents the same regression equation as table 1, but 
the analysis is performed in real terms. All nominal prices and 
taxes, in level terms, were deflated by the monthly all-country 
CPI to give constant December 2012 prices, from which the first 
differences were obtained. This model is likely to yield more 
realistic pass-through coefficients and non-tax-related monthly 
effects, because it assumes that nominal costs of production 
increase in line with inflation, rather than staying constant. In 
this specification, all pass-through coefficients and month effects 
are smaller than those presented in table 1.
For pre-2010, the contemporaneous pass-through coefficient 
is 1.06 (95% CI 1.02 to 1.10), and the long-run pass-through 
coefficient is 0.90 (95% CI 0.85 to 0.95). For post-2010 the 
contemporaneous pass-through coefficient is 0.75 (95% CI 
0.70 to 0.80) and the long-run pass-through coefficient is 0.49 
(95% CI 0.42 to 0.56). These results strongly suggest that the 
excise tax increases, expressed in real terms, were undershifted 
in both periods, but that the tax was increasingly undershifted in 
the post-2010 period.
The price increases in the other 9 months are specified to 
not be related to the March tax increase. Four of the 9 months 
pre-2010 and 7 of the 9 months post-2010 had negative monthly 
effects. The nominal prices in those months were generally 
unchanged, but the real price was eroded by inflation. In the 
pre-2010 period there was a sizeable real price increase in July 
(R0.14 in constant December 2012 prices) and August (R1.04). 
Post-2010 the July real price effect became negative, while the 
August and September real price effects were modestly positive.
The sum of the 9-monthly coefficients is R1.28 pre-2010 and 
negative R0.32 post-2010. Thus, other than the tax-related price 
changes, there was a substantial (average of 5.7% per annum) 
increase in the real price of cigarettes during the course of the 
year pre-2010, and a modest (average of 1.1% per annum) 
decrease in the real price during the course of the year post-2010.
DIscussIon
As one of the first middle-income countries to use excise tax 
increases as a tobacco control tool, South Africa has attracted 
much attention from the tobacco control community in the 
past two decades.2 28 29 The effectiveness of excise tax increases 
to reduce tobacco consumption depends crucially on how it 
impacts the retail price. In this paper we used a large data set of 
cigarette prices, collected by Statistics South Africa, to examine 
this relationship between 2001 and 2015.
Before 2010 there were two sizeable retail price increases each 
year, namely in March and July/August. Expressed in real terms, 
table 2 Pass-through coefficients (February to April) and monthly effects, real prices
Pre-2010 Post-2010
Data from month β (Feb-Apr) or δ 95% cI n r2 β 95% cI n r2
Feb −0.12*** −0.13 to −0.10 1676 0.12 −0.30*** −0.34 to −0.27 1213 0.19
Mar 1.06*** 1.02 to 1.10 1700 0.77 0.75*** 0.70 to 0.80 1187 0.44
Apr −0.04*** −0.07 to −0.01 1176 0.01 0.04*** 0.02 to 0.06 1678 0.01
May −0.04*** −0.06 to −0.02 1199 0.02 −0.05*** −0.06 to −0.03 1606 0.02
Jun −0.06*** −0.08 to −0.04 1211 0.03 −0.07*** −0.09 to −0.05 1602 0.03
Jul 0.14*** 0.09 to 0.19 1216 0.05 −0.11*** −0.14 to −0.09 1667 0.06
Aug 1.04*** 0.98 to 1.11 1210 0.52 0.12*** 0.09 to 0.14 1493 0.09
Sep 0.05*** 0.02 to 0.08 1202 0.01 0.08*** 0.05 to 0.12 1436 0.03
Oct 0.05*** 0.03 to 0.08 1205 0.03 −0.09*** −0.11 to −0.07 1447 0.08
Nov 0.04*** 0.02 to 0.06 1190 0.02 −0.04*** −0.06 to −0.02 1447 0.01
Dec 0.03 −0.01 to 0.07 1189 0.00 −0.03*** −0.04 to −0.01 1455 0.01
Jan −0.07*** −0.09 to 0.04 1151 0.03 −0.13*** −0.15 to −0.11 1280 0.16
The β coefficients for February to April are derived from equation 1 (in text), and are pass-through coefficients. The δ coefficients for May to January are derived from equation 2 
and indicate the month-on-month average increase in cigarette prices, expressed in rand per pack. N = the number of brand-region combinations.
Significance: ***=1%; **=5%; *=10%










70 Linegar DJ, van Walbeek C. Tob Control 2018;27:65–71. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2016-053340
research paper
the excise tax was slightly undershifted in March, meaning that 
the industry bore a small proportion of the tax increase. As a 
result, the net-of-tax price decreased in March. In July and/or 
August the tobacco industry substantially increased the retail 
price of cigarettes, more than compensating for the drop in the 
net-of-tax price in March.
The combined effect of the tax-induced price increase in 
March and the discretionary industry-driven price increase in 
July/August was to substantially raise the real retail price of 
cigarettes before 2010. In fact, between 1994 and 2010, of all 
30 consumer goods and services monitored by Statistics South 
Africa, cigarettes experienced the largest price increases.
The situation changed dramatically in 2010. Whereas the 
excise tax was slightly undershifted before 2010, it was substan-
tially undershifted after 2010. Also, whereas discretionary price 
increases by the tobacco industry raised the real price of ciga-
rettes before 2010, the tobacco industry was unable to do this 
after 2010. Even though there were modest nominal discre-
tionary price increases after 2010, in real terms they were nega-
tive because of the eroding effect of inflation.
One could argue that it is arbitrary to ascribe the February to 
April price increases to the March tax increase, but the other 
months’ price increases to the tobacco industry’s pricing strategy. 
If one were to take the view that all price increases are related to 
the excise tax increase, then one would conclude that the excise 
tax was overshifted before 2010, but was still undershifted in the 
subsequent period.
The literature on tobacco tax pass-through is limited and is 
focused primarily on the USA.9–15 Most of these studies find 
that excise taxes are overshifted. Our results are more nuanced. 
Our preferred results suggest that there is no evidence to indi-
cate that excise taxes are overshifted, although if one takes the 
view that all price changes can be attributed to the excise tax 
increase, there was substantial overshifting in the period prior 
to 2010. Excise taxes are substantially undershifted in the post-
2010 period.
Pre-2010, the tobacco industry aggressively raised the retail 
price in July/August, enhancing its turnover and overall profit-
ability, and more than making up for the loss of profit due to the 
undershifting of the tax increase in March. The very large profits 
earned by the large tobacco companies, despite a challenging 
regulatory and legislative environment, attracted a number of 
aggressive cigarette manufacturers into the market towards the 
end of the first decade of the 21st century. Some of these manu-
facturers were legal, some were not. The presence of low-price 
cigarettes dramatically changed the cigarette market. Previously, 
the multinational incumbents had been able to exploit their 
(near-)monopoly power, but this was no longer possible after 
2010. It became increasingly difficult to pass excise tax increases 
onto the consumer. A substantially larger proportion of the tax 
increase was thus borne by cigarette producers.
From a tobacco control perspective, the developments since 
2010 have been unfortunate. Excise tax increases have become 
less effective in decreasing tobacco consumption, because the 
excise tax pass-through is lower than before 2010. Furthermore, 
the competitive environment has changed, with the tobacco 
industry less able to impose discretionary price increases on its 
customers. Before 2010, the discretionary price increases made 
cigarettes less affordable. Since 2010, that support for tobacco 
control has disappeared.
To achieve the same percentage increase in the retail price, the 
government has to increase the excise tax by a larger amount 
than in the past. From a fiscal perspective, that would be bene-
ficial, because a larger increase in the excise tax per cigarette 
would result in more tax revenues. The government would have 
to overcome the industry’s resistance and its claims that excise 
tax increases will increase illicit trade.28 With sufficient political 
will, South Africa can revitalise the single most important tool to 
rejuvenate its flagging tobacco control strategy.
What this paper adds
 ► This paper considers the relationship between changes in
the excise tax and changes in the retail price in South Africa
between 2001 and 2015. Like in many other countries, the
cigarette manufacturing industry in South Africa is highly
concentrated, giving it much pricing power. Prior to 2010 the
industry increased the retail price of cigarettes twice a year: 
in March in response to the excise tax increase, and in July/
August largely independent of the price.
 ► The very high net-of-tax prices earned by the incumbent
firms attracted competitors to the market, which competed
largely on price. The increased levels of competition reduced
the power of firms to pass through the tax increases and
raise the retail price. Since 2010 the excise tax increases
have been undershifted.
 ► South Africa’s experience indicates that tobacco companies’
ability to pass through the excise tax is constrained by the
degree of competition in the market. This has implications
for the effectiveness of excise tax increases as a tobacco
control tool.
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